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TIE REMOVAL OF ALIENS WHO DRINK AND
DRIVE: FELONY DWI AS A CRIME OF

VIOLENCE UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
Julie Anne Rah *
"[Djeportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in
this country. Such aforfeiture is a penalty."I
"No man is above the law and no man is below it;
nor do we ask any
man's permission when we requirehim to obey
it.
Obedience
to the law
2
favor."
a
as
asked
not
right;
a
as
is demanded
INTRODUCTION

Removal from the United States is undoubtedly one of the harshest
penalties facing a resident alien. Yet it is equally clear that aliens who
commit particularly serious crimes must be deported
While the
United States will continue to welcome people from other nations, our
government is clear in its message that it will not tolerate certain
offenses committed by alien criminals at the cost of the rights and
privileges of American citizens. The question of what crimes are
sufficiently serious to warrant removal, however, has caused some
controversy among the courts.
The difficulty of this question is created by the Legislature's use of
vague terms to describe removable offenses, without providing
sufficiently clear definitions to facilitate their interpretation. For
example, among other crimes, Congress authorizes the government to

* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank

Professor Abner S. Greene for his inspiration and support. A special thank you to my
mom and dad, my brothers, and Johnny Kim for always loving and believing in me.
1. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
2. Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (December 7, 1903), in Familiar
Quotations 687 (John Bartlett ed., 1980).

3. The Immigration and Nationality Act uses the term "removable" to mean
that, where an alien has not yet been admitted to the United States, the alien is
inadmissible and, where an alien has been admitted to the United States, the alien is
deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2000). This Note will use the terms -removable"
and "deportable" interchangeably.

2109

2110

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

deport aliens for committing
either a "crime of moral turpitude"4 or a
"crime of violence."'5 While Congress failed to define the term "crime
of moral turpitude,"6 Congress defined a "crime of violence" as a
crime "that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense." 7 Unfortunately, this
definition of crime of violence has caused interpretive difficulties
within the courts.

For example, the circuit courts currently are split over the issue of
whether felony driving while intoxicated ("felony DWI")8 constitutes
a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16. The Board of Immigration
Appeals ("BIA") recently interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) to encompass
felony DWI,9 precipitating a string of circuit court cases addressing
the same issue. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
disagreed with the BIA, holding that felony DWI is not a crime of
violence, while the Tenth Circuit held that felony DWI is a crime of
violence." The debate generally centers around whether the language

4. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). A crime of violence is one of many crimes that
constitute a deportable "aggravated felony." See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U). In
1988, Congress added the term "aggravated felony" to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, thereby creating a new category of removable crimes. Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); see also infra Part I.B.3.a. At first, the definition
of "aggravated felony" was somewhat limited, including murder, drug trafficking, and
arms trafficking. § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70. Over the past decade, however,
Congress has repeatedly amended the definition, broadening it to cover over twenty
subcategories of removable offenses, including a crime of violence. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(A)-(U); see also infra Part I.B.3.a. The Immigration and Nationality Act
defines a crime of violence by reference to another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16
(2000). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F); see also infra Part I.C.1.
6. See infra note 43.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
8. For the purposes of this Note, the term "felony DWI" refers to statutory
drunk driving offenses that rise to a felony based on the number of prior convictions.
For example, Virginia makes DWI a felony upon the third and subsequent
convictions. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-270(C) (Michie 1950 & Supp. IV 1996) ("Any
person convicted of three or more [DWI] offenses ... committed within a ten-year
period shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony ...

.").

Alabama felony DWI occurs upon

the fourth and subsequent convictions. See Ala. Code § 32-5A-191(h) (1975) ("On a
fourth or subsequent conviction, a person convicted of violating this section shall be
guilty of a Class C felony ....

").

In North Dakota, the fifth and subsequent

convictions constitute felony DWI. See N.D. Cent. Code § 39-08-01(2) (1997) ("A
person violating this section or equivalent ordinance is guilty... of a class C felony
for a fifth or subsequent offense in a seven-year period.").
9. In re Arturo Puente-Salazar, Interim Decision 3412 (BIA 1999). See infra
Part I.C.3. for a discussion of the BIA's role in removal proceedings and the BIA's
analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 16.
10. For a discussion of the courts holding that felony DWI is not a crime of
violence, see infra Part II.A. For a discussion of the courts holding that felony DWI is
a crime of violence, see infra Part II.B.
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of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) requires a crime of violence to involve a specific
intent to use physical force.
The importance of resolving this issue is highlighted in Judge Rhesa
Hawkins Barksdale's dissent to the denial of a petition for rehearing
en banc of United States v. Chapa-Garza." Judge Barksdale writes
that the issue of whether felony DWI is a crime of violence is one
"affecting hundreds if not thousands of aliens."' 2 Judge Barksdale
goes on to say that "[t]he attention this issue has recently received, the
exacerbation of the circuit split since Chapa-Garzawas rendered, and
the action taken by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in
1' 3
response to Chapa-Garza highlight the importance of the issue.
The need to secure uniformity in the implementation of our country's
immigration laws underscores the importance of resolving this issue.
This Note addresses the question of whether felony DVI
constitutes a crime of violence by analyzing the definition of crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), evaluating congressional policies
behind its immigration laws, and proposing an amendment to the
immigration law's definition of crime of violence. Part I of this Note
discusses Congress's broad power over immigration and the history of
immigration law in the United States, focusing on provisions
regarding removal. Part I also explains the categorical approach used
by the BIA and the courts to determine whether an offense
constitutes a crime of violence, and discusses the BIA's interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Part II examines the competing views of the
circuit courts as to whether felony DWI is a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16. Specifically, Part II highlights the circuit courts'
disagreement over whether the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. §
16(b) requires a crime of violence to involve specific intent to use
physical force, thus excluding felony DWI because drunk driving does
not involve such intent.
Finally, Part III argues, based on the language of the statute, that
the BIA and Tenth Circuit correctly interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) to
include felony DWI. Part III then suggests that congressional policies
regarding removal further support a finding that felony DXVI
constitutes a removable offense. Part III concludes by urging the
Legislature to amend § 1101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and
11. 243 F3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001). Chapa-Garzaheld that Texas felony DWI is not
a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Id at 928. See United States v. ChapaGarza, 262 F.3d 479, 480 (5th Cir. 2001), for Judge Barksdale's dissent.
12- Chapa-Garza,262 F.3d at 480 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
13. Id. The BIA held in In re Puente-Salazarthat felony DWI constitutes a crime
of violence. Interim Decision 3412 at 14-15. In light of the Chapa-Garza decision, the

BIA decided to no longer remove aliens convicted of felony DWI in the Fifth Circuit.
See In re Olivares-Martinez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 148, 149-50 (BIA 2001) (stating that

"[t]he Board historically follows a court's precedent in cases arising in that circuit").
Thus, the BIA will undoubtedly refrain from removing aliens convicted of felony
DWI in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits as well.
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Nationality Act. Rather than referring to the definition of crime of
violence at 18 U.S.C. § 16, the Act should incorporate the language of
section 4B1.2(a) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which defines the
term "crime of violence" for career offenders.14 Such an amendment
would clarify the immigration law's "crime of violence" definition to
include reckless conduct that is particularly dangerous, such as
repeated drinking and driving.
I. BACKGROUND

A. CongressionalPower Over Immigration
The Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress broad
power over immigration.
Although the Constitution does not
explicitly state Congress's authority over immigration, the Supreme
Court has held that such authority derives from Congress's power to
regulate commerce.15 Other constitutional sources of federal power
over immigration are the Naturalization Clause, 6 the Migration or
Importation Clause, 7 and the War Powers Clause. 8 Congress's
power to control immigration is also implied from the inherent right
of a sovereign to control its borders. 9
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld Congress's plenary
powers over immigration, including power over the exclusion and
deportation of aliens."0 The Court has proclaimed that Congress's

14. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a) (2001). See infra note 101 for
the U.S. Sentencing Guideline's definition of crime of violence.
15. The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress "[tjo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g.,
Edye v. Robertson ("Head Money Cases"), 112 U.S. 580, 591 (1884) (upholding
federal tax on arriving aliens under the Commerce Clause); Smith v. Turner ("The
Passenger Cases"), 48 U.S. (1 How.) 282 (1849) (holding that state statutes imposing a
tax on immigrants arriving in the ports of the state are unconstitutional).
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (vesting in Congress the power "[tlo establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization").
17. Id. § 9, cl. 1 (dealing with limiting migration and importation of "[s]uch
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit").
18. Id. § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war). This power gives
Congress the authority to expel aliens from the U.S. and/or to prevent his or her
entry. See Ira J. Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook 19 (6th ed. 1998).
19. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952) (stating that the
power to expel aliens is a power "inherent in every sovereign state"); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (holding that "[t]he right to exclude or to
expel all aliens [is] ... an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and
independent nation"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States ("The Chinese Exclusion
Case"), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (finding that the power to exclude foreigners is "an
incident of sovereignty").
20. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)
(stating that congressional power to exclude or deport aliens is "largely immune from
judicial control"); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713-14 (extending congressional power
to both deportation and exclusion).
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exclusive control over the formulation of immigration policies "has
become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues
of our body politic as any aspect of our government.'2
Thus,
although issues concerning aliens within this country raise challenging
policy questions, it is clear that Congress has broad and wellestablished authority to exclude or deport aliens for any reason that it
deems necessary to protect this country's best interest.2
B. The History of Removal Law in the United States
Exercising its broad powers over immigration, Congress has, over
the years, enacted numerous laws regarding the exclusion and
deportation of aliens from the United States, resulting in a "complex
scheme" of immigration law? 3 The following history of immigration
law will focus on one of the most significant trends in immigration law
and policy over the past decade: the growing emphasis on the swift
removal of aliens with criminal convictions. Over the years, Congress
has declared its hard-line position against criminal aliens by increasing
the substantive grounds for removal while decreasing the available
procedural remedies.
1. Removal Law Before 1952
Apart from the short-lived Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798,24 the
first one hundred years of this nation's existence was a period of
unrestricted immigration.25 The primary reasons for this open-door
policy were the broad frontier and a developing nation's need for
labor.' The nation, however, soon became dissatisfied with the
unimpeded flow of immigration. Thus, in 1875, Congress invoked its
power over immigration and passed its first restrictive statute, barring
21. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,531 (1954).
22. See Brent K. Newcomb, Comment, Immigration Law and the CriminalAlien:
A Comparison of Policiesfor Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent Residents
Convicted of Aggravated Felonies,51 Okla. L. Rev. 697,702 (1998).
23. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) ("Drawing upon this power, upon
its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international commerce,
and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders. Congress has
developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our
borders."). Courts have often noted that immigration law is one of the most
complicated areas of United States law. See, eg., Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir.
1977) ("We ... note the striking resemblance between some of the laws we are called
upon to interpret and King Minos's labyrinth in ancient Crete. The Tax Laws and the
Immigration and Nationality Acts are examples... of Congress's ingenuity in passing
statutes certain to accelerate the aging process of judges.").
24. The 1798 Alien & Sedition Acts provided for the deportation of criminal
aliens, but Congress either repealed them or allowed them to expire. Act of July 14,
1798, ch. 74,1 Stat. 596 (expired Mar. 3, 1801); Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570
(expired June 25, 1800); Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802).
25. 1 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 2.0211] (1999).
26. Id
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the admission of convicts and prostitutes. 27 Over the years, the
number of "quality control" 2 exclusions would grow to include,
among others, lunatics, idiots, and those likely to become a "public
charge."29
In 1882, Congress passed the nation's first racist immigration laws
aimed at stemming the flood of immigrants from China. 0 The
"Chinese Exclusion Acts" suspended all immigration of Chinese
laborers for a period of ten years and forbade any United States court
to admit Chinese residents to citizenship.31
As Congress began to impose restrictions on admission into the
country, it also began to consider the need to remove those who had
illegally entered the country.32 Thus, at first, deportation statutes
acted primarily as supplements to the exclusion laws. 33 For example,
the March 3, 1891 Act made deportable "any alien who shall come
into the United States in violation of law." 3 In 1907, however,
Congress made deportable any alien who was a prostitute "at any time
within three years after she shall have entered the United States. 3 5
Notably, this statute authorized for the first time the deportation of an
alien based on her conduct after she had made a lawful entry.36
In 1917, Congress passed a comprehensive revision of the
immigration laws, best known for its controversial literacy test.37 The
Quota Law of 1921, enacted as a temporary measure, was the first law
38
that limited the number of immigrants permitted each year.
27. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78; 1 Oscar M. Trelles II &
James F. Bailey III, Immigration and Nationality Acts: Legislative Histories and
Related Documents 335 (1979).
28. David Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell 6 (3d ed.
1992).
29. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat 214, 214.
30. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration: Process and Policy 2 (3d
ed. 1995). In the "Chinese Exclusion Case," the Supreme Court upheld such
legislation, stating: "That the government of the United States, through the action of
the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which
we do not think open to controversy." Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
603 (1889).
31. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
The Chinese exclusion laws were repealed in 1943, at which time the Chinese were
made eligible for immigration and naturalization. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57
Stat. 600.
32. See Aleinikoff et al., supra note 30, at 511.
33. Id.
34. Act of Mar. 3,1891, ch.551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086.
35. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3,34 Stat. 898, 900.
36. Christina LaBrie, Note, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal
Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 357,359-60 (1999).
37. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (excluding all "aliens over
sixteen years of age, physically capable of reading, who can not read the English
language, or some other language or dialect"); Charles Gordon & Ellen Gittel
Gordon, Immigration and Nationality Law § 1.1c (Student ed. 1979).
38. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5, 5-6 (expired June 30, 1922); Gordon
& Gordon, supra note 37, § 1.1c.
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Congress enacted a permanent policy of imposing numerical
restrictions in 1924.29 Until 1952, the immigration laws of 1917 and
1924 remained substantially unchanged.
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
In 1952, Congress coordinated all of the existing immigration laws
into one statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
("INA"). ° Originally, the INA established a preference system,
favoring skilled workers and the relatives of United States citizens and
permanent resident aliens, and a controversial national-origins quota
system, imposing a 150,000-person ceiling on immigration from the
Eastern Hemisphere. 1 Although Congress has amended the INA
repeatedly since 1952, much of the 1952 Act remains as originally
enacted and provides the foundation for immigration and nationality
law in effect today 2
Along with its preference and quota systems, the INA also
authorized the deportation of any alien convicted of a "crime
involving moral turpitude."43 Although the statute itself does not
39. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159-60. The 1924 legislation
adopted a formula that favored immigrants from countries that were already heavily
represented in the United States. See id.; Gordon & Gordon, supra note 37, § 1.1c.
Because few new immigrants were arriving from the preferred countries, the quota
system significantly reduced the overall number of aliens entering the United States.
See Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, Immigration Fundamentals: A Guide
to Law and Practice 1-3 (3d ed. 1994).
40. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)); Aleinikoff et al., supra note
30, at 56.
41. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 30, at 56-57.
42. Gordon & Gordon, supra note 37, § 1.2.
43. § 241, 66 Stat. at 204-08 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)).
The term "moral turpitude" first appeared in the March 3, 1891 Act, which denied
entry to aliens convicted of a "felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude." Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084; 1
Trelles & Bailey, supra note 27, at 350. Congress, however, did not define the term
"moral turpitude" in the March 3, 1891 Act or the accompanying House or Senate
reports. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 30, at 542.
The term "moral turpitude" also appeared in the Act of 1917. Act of Feb. 5,
1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. Again, Congress generally remained silent as to
what types of crimes constituted crimes of moral turpitude. Aleinikoff et al., supra
note 30, at 543. Apparently, Congress believed that the term had "acquired a
commonly known meaning over time and were content to let continuing
interpretation by immigration officials and judges control." Id.
Although it remained largely undefined, the 1952 Act adopted the term
"moral turpitude" as a grounds for removal. Id. at 543-44. As in the past, Congress
failed to discuss the meaning of the term. Id. at 544. In sum, the legislative history
reveals that Congress never attempted to define the meaning of "moral turpitude."
Id- The lack of a clear definition suggests that "[tihe phrase had ancient lineage and
application outside the immigration laws when it was included in the statute. No
doubt, Congress assumed that its meaning in other areas would be imported into the
1891 immigration law." Id. (citations omitted).
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define moral turpitude,"I moral turpitude generally refers to conduct
that "shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or
depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the
duties owed between persons or to society in general."'45 Courts have
interpreted "crime of moral turpitude" to include fraud, murder,
kidnapping, rape, prostitution, burglary, theft, and arson.46 This
provision applies if the alien commits a crime of moral turpitude
within five years of entry and is either sentenced to confinement or
actually confined for a year or more.47 An alien is also deportable if
he or she commits two unrelated crimes of moral turpitude at any
time after admission.4 s
3. Significant Amendments to the INA Since 1952
Since 1952, Congress has enacted several significant amendments to
the INA. Characterized by a get-tough attitude toward criminal
aliens, these amendments have both expanded the substantive
grounds for removal and decreased the procedural remedies available
to criminal aliens.
a. The Expansion of Removable Crimes
The problem of criminal aliens recaptured Congress's attention in
the 1980s when immigration levels began to rise,4 9 along with an
increase in reported criminal-alien activity." Not coincidentally, the
percentage of aliens in the prison population rose as well.51 Congress
recognized the seriousness of the criminal-alien problem and the need
to impose stiffer penalties. 2 Thereafter, Congress dramatically
increased the types of removable crimes through a number of
significant amendments to the INA. Although crimes of moral
turpitude continued to constitute grounds for removal, the types of

44. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
45. Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Franklin, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994)).
46. Franco Capriotti et al., Small-Time Crime Big-Time Trouble: The New
Immigration Laws, 13 Crim. Just. 4, 5 (1998).
47. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
48. Id. (a)(2)(A)(ii).
49. From 1981 to 1990, immigration rose sixty-one percent above the period from
1971 to 1980, with a total of 7,338,062 people entering the United States. Craig H.
Feldman, Note, The Immigration Act of 1990: Congress Continues to Aggravate the
CriminalAlien, 17 Seton Hall Legis. J. 201, 209 n.47 (1993). During the 1980s, the
number of immigrants entering the United States nearly matched the number that
had entered over the previous twenty years. Id. In 1990, 1,536,483 immigrants
entered the United States, which, at the time, was the highest in any one year. Id.
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id. at 210.
52. Id.
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removable offenses would come to include an even broader range of
conduct.
Congress began its campaign to combat the criminal-alien problem
in 1988 by passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act ("ADAA").
The
ADAA broadened the types of removable offenses by introducing the
aggravated felony, which would constitute a completely separate
basis for deportability.55
The ADAA defined aggravated felony as "murder, any drug
trafficking crime.., or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or
destructive devices.., or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any
such act, committed within the United States."'
Unlike crimes
involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies need not be committed
within five years after entry into the United States." With the
creation of this new category of removable crimes, Congress evinced a
clear determination to expel from the United States a broader class of
criminal aliens.58
In the years following the ADAA, Congress rapidly expanded the
list of crimes that constitute an aggravated felony. In the Immigration
Act of 199019 ("1990 Act"), Congress expanded the "aggravated
felony" definition to include any illicit trafficking in any controlled
substance and money laundering, as long as the sentence was five
years or more.' The 1990 Act also added "any crime of violence (as
defined in [18 U.S.C. § 16]... ) for which the term of imprisonment
imposed (regardless of any suspension of such imprisonment) is at
least 5 years."'" A crime of violence is any "offense that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another, or... involves a substantial
53. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
54. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43) (2000)).
55. Feldman, supra note 49, at 206.
56. § 7342,102 Stat. at 4469-70 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
57. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
58. See, ag., 136 Cong. Rec. S17741 (Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Graham)
("The aggravated felony aliens' provisions in the 1988 act were important steps
toward solving a major problem faced by Federal and State criminal justice systemsthe problem of how to expeditiously remove from our streets those aliens who are
convicted of murder, or trafficking in drugs or weapons.").
59. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
60. Immigration Act of 1990 § 501(a)(2)-(3), 104 Stat. at 5048 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)).
61. § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. at 5048 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(F)). Congress later made the 1990 Act retroactive so that convictions
need not occur after the enactment of the 1990 Act for it to apply to deportation
hearings. See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 306(a)(13), 105 Stat. 1733, 1752 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
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risk that physical force... may be used in the course of committing
the offense." 62
The Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994
added a broad range of federal and state crimes to the growing list of
removable crimes.' Then, in the most recent and, arguably, the most
substantial expansion of the aggravated felony definition, Congress
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

("AEDPA")6 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA").65 Both the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA greatly increased the number of aliens whose criminal
convictions make them removable.'
Significantly, the IIRIRA
reduced the sentence requirement from a five-year minimum to a oneyear minimum for crimes added by the AEDPA as well as for crimes
of violence, theft, receipt of stolen property, burglary, RICO
violations, alien smuggling, and document fraud. 67 The IIRIRA also
made its provisions retroactive. 68

62. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
63. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). The 1994
Act made the following crimes aggravated felonies: the illicit trafficking in firearms
or explosives, theft and burglary offenses for which the sentence is at least five years,
receipt of stolen property, kidnapping for ransom, child pornography, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") violations with a five-year
sentence, running a prostitution business, espionage, treason, fraud or tax evasion in
amounts over $200,000, alien smuggling, certain document fraud, and failure to
surrender for a prison sentence of fifteen years or more. Id.
64. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (relevant portions codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.). The AEDPA was enacted in response to the 1995 Oklahoma
City bombing as an effort to deter and punish terrorism. Terry Coonan, Dolphins
Caught in Congressional Fishnets-Immigration Law's New Aggravated Felons, 12
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 589, 600 (1998). Although President Clinton opined that the bill
"made a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having nothing
to do with fighting terrorism," he signed the bill into law on April 24, 1996. Id.
65. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (relevant portions
codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). Congress passed the
IIRIRA six months after the AEDPA, devoting an entire bill to immigration and
implementing significant amendments to the INA. Coonan, supra note 64, at 601-05.
66. With the AEDPA, Congress added the following offenses to the definition of
aggravated felony: commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, certain kinds of
stolen vehicle trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury, bribery of a witness, a second
conviction involving gambling offenses, transportation for prostitution, failure to
appear before a court to answer to a felony charge, and illegal re-entry if an alien
already has a conviction for an aggravated felony. AEDPA § 440(e), 110 Stat. at 127778 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). The IIRIRA added rape and sexual abuse of
a minor to the definition of aggravated felony. IIRIRA § 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 30093627 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).
67. § 321(a)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009-627 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
68. § 321(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-3628 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
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b. The DecreasedAvailability of ProceduralRemedies
Beginning with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, in addition to
expanding the grounds for removal, the amendments to the INA also
decreased the procedural remedies available to criminal aliens,
particulariy aggravated felons. The ADAA established expedited
deportation procedures for aliens with aggravated felony convictions,
requiring that the proceedings be completed before the alien is
released from incarceration for the underlying crime.6 9 This provision
authorized the government to deport aggravated felons immediately
after their release from prison." The ADAA also required that the
Attorney General detain aggravated felons during the period
following release from incarceration until the conclusion of the
deportation hearing."! Other provisions included the elimination of
voluntary departure for aggravated felons.' the creation of a
presumption of deportability,n7 and the reduction of the time period in
which an aggravated felon may appeal a removal order from six
months to sixty days.74 Finally, the ADAA prohibited a deported
aggravated felon from reapplying for admission to the United States
for a period of ten years.
The 1990 Act further decreased the procedural remedies available
to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Before the 1990 Act, a
waiver of exclusion or deportation was available to legal permanent
residents if they had a "lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years" in the United States. 76 The 1990 Act, however,
limited the discretionary waiver, making it unavailable to legal
permanent residents who were convicted of an aggravated felony and
had served a sentence of at least five years.' The 1990 Act also
reduced the time period for filing a petition of review of a final
deportation order from sixty days to thirty days78 and further
increased the period of inadmissibility for deported aggravated felons
from ten years to twenty years.79 And, for the first time, Congress
69. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7347, 102 Stat. 4181,
4471-72 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3)).
70. Feldman, supra note 49, at 207.
71. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7343(a), 102 Stat. at 4470 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)).
72. § 7343(b), 102 Stat. at 4470 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1)).
73. § 7347(c), 102 Stat. at 4472 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)).
74. § 7347(b), 102 Stat. at 4472 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)); see
also infra text accompanying note 78.
75. § 7349, 102 Stat. at 4473 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii));
see also infra text accompanying notes 79, 86.
76. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat.
163, 187.
77. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978,5052.
78. § 502(a), 104 Stat. at 5048 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)).
79. § 514,104 Stat. at 5053 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)).

2120

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

explicitly barred an alien convicted of an aggravated felony from
applying for either asylum or withholding of deportation."
Congress continued to limit the procedural remedies available to
criminal aliens with the AEDPA and the IIRIRA.
Before 1996, a lawful permanent resident could apply for
discretionary relief from removal, even if his removal was based on
criminal grounds, including aggravated felonies, if the sentence served
was less than five years.81 The AEDPA, however, specifically
disallowed discretionary relief for aggravated felons; 82 and then, the
IIRIRA completely repealed
such relief and replaced it with
"cancellation of removal."8 This new procedure bars cancellation of
removal for all aggravated felons, regardless of the length of their
residence in the United States, the hardship to remaining family
members, and whether the aliens will face persecution in their country
of origin. 84 The IIRIRA also removed from all courts the jurisdiction
to review any final order of removal against an alien deportable as an
aggravated felon.85 Finally, aliens who have been removed on the
basis of an aggravated felony are now permanently barred from the
United States.86
C. Felony D WI As a Crime of Violence
As discussed
amendments to
Congress greatly
the purposes of

previously, through a number of significant
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
expanded the substantive grounds for removal. For
this Note, the most significant addition to the

80. § 515, 104 Stat. at 5053 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)) (rendering aggravated
felons ineligible for asylum and withholding of deportation because they had
committed a "particularly serious crime" and were a danger to the community).
81. Bruce Robert Marley, Comment, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences
of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent
Residents, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 855, 874 & n.97 (1998).
82. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277.
83. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-594 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). A legal permanent resident qualifies for cancellation if he or she
has been present in the United States for seven years, was a legal permanent resident
for at least five of those years, and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony. 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Other aliens qualify for cancellation if they have been physically
and continuously present in the United States for a period of at least ten years, have
been persons of good moral character during that time, have not been convicted of
certain criminal offenses, and can establish that removal would result in "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" to an immediate relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1220b(b).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
85. IIRIRA, § 306, 110 Stat. at 3009-607 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
If an aggravated felon re-enters after
deportation, the government can prosecute him or her under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) for
the crime of re-entry. See generally James P. Fleissner & James A. Shapiro, Federal
Sentences for Aliens Convicted of Illegal Reentry Following Deportation: Who Needs
the Aggravation?, 9 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 451 (1995) (examining the law governing the
re-entry of deported aliens, and arguing that Congress's approach to changing the law
has been "unprincipled").
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subcategories of crimes that constitute a deportable aggravated felony
is a "crime of violence," as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 16.
Before addressing the circuit split over whether felony DVI
constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the
following sections discuss: the statutory background of the "crime of
violence" definition; the categorical approach used by the courts and
the Board of Immigration Appeals to determine whether an offense
constitutes a crime of violence; and the BIA's interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 16(b).
1. Statutory Background
Under current immigration laws, an alien who is convicted of a
crime of violence, wvith at least a one-year sentence imposed, is
considered an aggravated felon subject to removal. s9 A crime of
violence is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) by reference to
another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16. 90 18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a
crime of violence as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. I
Offenses that the courts have held to be crimes of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16, and thereby, removable offenses, include burglary of a
habitation, 92 unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,9 3 involuntary
manslaughter,' assisting or instigating escape or attempted escape of
a prisoner, 9 and indecency with a child involving sexual contact.6
Although relatively new to the INA, the term "crime of violence" is
used throughout the United States Code. For Title 18, 18 U.S.C. § 16
serves as the general definition of crime of violence. 9 In addition, 18
87.
88.
89.
90.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
See infra Part II.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
Id.

91. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).

92. E.g., United States v. Guadardo, 40 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. 1994).
93. E.g., United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999).
94. E.g., Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001).
95. E.g., United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1993).
96. E.g., United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 1996).
97. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 929(a)(1)(2000) (punishing the use of restricted
ammunition during the commission of a crime of violence); 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2)
(forbidding the use of interstate travel, commerce, or mail with intent to commit a
crime of violence); 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(4) (punishing attempts or conspiracies to
commit a crime of violence in aid of any racketeering activity).
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U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(3) and 3156(a)(4) contain separate definitions of
crime of violence, which are virtually identical to that at 18 U.S.C. §
16.98 Prior to 1989, the United States Sentencing Guidelines defined
the term "crime of violence" for career offenders at section 4B1.2 by
incorporating the definition at 18 U.S.C. § 16,11 just as is currently
done in § 1101(a)(43)(F) of the INA.'0° However, effective November
1, 1989, the sentencing guidelines amended section 4B1.2 by dropping
reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16 and defining a crime of violence, in part, as
an offense that "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another."101 As discussed later in Part III.C, the
courts have consistently interpreted the "crime of violence" definition
under the sentencing guidelines to include certain reckless conduct,
including drunk-driving offenses."°
2. The Categorical Approach to Analyzing Crimes of Violence Under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
Although the circuits disagree on the question of whether felony
DWI is a crime of violence, the courts agree that the phrase "by its
nature" in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) compels the courts to use a categorical
approach, rather than an examination of the underlying facts of the
conviction, to determine whether an offense constitutes a crime of
violence. 10 3
98. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(3), 3156(a)(4). The differences between these statutes and
18 U.S.C. § 16 are minimal, involving minor discrepancies in punctuation, and have no
real effect on the meaning of the statutes.
99. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, at 106-07 (1997). A defendant
is a career offender if:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant
committed the instant offense of conviction, (2) the instant offense of
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4Bl.1 (2001).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2000).
101. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, 106-07 (1997). U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines section 4B1.2 provides in full:
(a) The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or state
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves the use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 (2001).
102. See infra Part III.C.
103. See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that the
language of the statute requires a categorical approach focused on the "intrinsic
nature of the offense rather than on the factual circumstances surrounding any
particular violation"); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating
that the court would employ a categorical approach to determine whether certain
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Under this approach, the court need only determine whether the
generic elements of the offense underlying the conviction constitute a
crime of violence. 104 "If a crime by its nature presents a substantial
risk that force will be used against the property [or person] of another,
then it falls within the ambit of § 16(b) whether [or not] such force
was actually used in the crime."' 5 In an all-or-nothing categorical
analysis, if the definition of an offense found in a particular statute
covers both conduct that constitutes a crime of violence and conduct
that does not, a court will not deem a conviction under the statute a
crime of violence." 6 In such situations, the court will use a "modified
categorical approach" and examine the charging paper and judgment
of conviction to assess whether or not the actual offense underlying
the defendant's conviction constitutes a crime of violence1 7 The
court, however, wiU not consider the particular facts surrounding the
conviction." 8 The BIA also applies a categorical approach in
analyzing whether a conviction constitutes a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b), requiring an examination of the generic elements of
the crime, rather than the specific facts of the case, to determine
whether a crime involves a substantial risk that physical force may be
used. 109

conduct constitutes a crime of violence); United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d
418, 421 (5th Cir. 1996) ("A sentencing court need only consider the fact that [the
defendant] was convicted and the inherent nature of the offense."); United States v.
Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "a court must only look
to the statutory definition, not the underlying circumstances of the crime," in deciding
whether an offense is "by its nature" a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b));
United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that "a
sentencing court is not required to consider the underlying circumstances" of the

crime).
104. Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 606.
105. United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d 18,21 n.14 (5th Cir. 1995).
106. See Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1999). For example, the Ninth
Circuit held that the crime of vehicle burglary under section 459 of the California
Penal Code is not a crime of violence, because section 459 "does not require an
unprivileged or unlawful entry into the vehicle, [and] a person can commit vehicle
burglary by borrowing the keys of another person's car and then stealing the car radio
once inside." Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
107. See Sareang Ye, 214 F.3d at 1133 (citing United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322,
1327 (9th Cir. 1993)).
10& Id109. In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801,809-13 (BIA 1994).
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3. The Board of Immigration Appeals' Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
16(b)

a. Administrative Structure
While Congress uses its constitutional power to create and establish
immigration law, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Department
of State have the power and burden of administering and enforcing
these laws. 110 Specifically, Congress vests nearly all of the authority to
administer and enforce the immigration laws in the Attorney General,
who delegates most of these responsibilities to other officials within
the DOJ, particularly the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") and the Executive Office for Immigration Review
("EOIR").11

The INS handles much of the day-to-day duties of immigration,
such as processing visa petitions and adjustments of status and
patrolling the border."' The EOIR consists of the immigration judges
and the Board of Immigration Appeals.'
The immigration judges
conduct removal hearings,"14 and the immigration judges' decisions are
automatically appealable to the BIA. 115 The BIA is an administrative
body that is distinct and independent from the INS and directly
accountable to the Attorney General. 1 6 Upon exhaustion of all
administrative remedies,'17 judicial review of removal determinations
is available in some cases," 8 either before a United States district
court or a United States court of appeals." 9

110. 1 Gordon et al., supra note 25, § 3.01[1].
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000). ("The Attorney General shall be charged with the
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the
immigration and naturalization of aliens .... "); see also 1 Gordon et al., supra note
25, § 3.01[1] ("The major enforcement responsibilities under the immigration laws are
assigned to the Attorney General.").
112. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 30, at 103-04.
113. See id. at 112.
114. Before 1996, the INS removed aliens to their home countries through
exclusion or deportation hearings, depending on whether the alien had made an entry
into the United States. See Richard D. Steel, Steel on Immigration Law § 14.01 (2d
ed. 2000). The IIRIRA replaced these hearings with one removal hearing. Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587 (1996). Although there is one
consolidated hearing, an alien who has not been admitted to the United States has the
burden to prove admissibility "beyond doubt," see 5 Gordon et al., supra note 25, §
64.03[21[b], while the government must prove deportability by "clear and convincing
evidence," id. § 64.03[2][e].
115. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(2) (2001).
116. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 30, at 112.
117. Steel, supra note 114, § 14.23.
118. Several categories of aliens, including aggravated felons, no longer have a
statutory right to seek judicial review of their removal orders. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C) (2000). However, the courts have noted that, although the statute may
bar them from reviewing final orders of removal against any alien based on an
aggravated felony, the courts retain jurisdiction to review the threshold question of
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b. In re Puente-Salazar: Felony DWI Isa Crime of Violence
In September 1999, the Board of Immigration Appeals rendered
the decision that led to the recent string of circuit court cases
addressing the issue of whether felony DWI constitutes a crime of
violence. In In re Puente-Salazar,"2 Puente-Salazar, a native and
citizen of Mexico, sought review of an immigration judge's decision
finding him removable as a result of his conviction for Texas felony
DWI."' Upon appeal, the BIA agreed with the immigration judge,
holding that Puente-Salazar's conviction constituted a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),12 and therefore, a removable
aggravated felony."
The BIA began its analysis by noting that it would apply the
categorical approach to determine whether felony DWI constitutes a
crime of violence under § 16(b).124 Thus, the offense must be a felony
that, by its inherent nature, would involve a risk that physical force
would be used against the person or property of another, regardless of
whether the risk develops or the harm actually occurs. 12
Then, relying on its own precedent, the BIA rejected the
respondent's main argument that the physical force described in the
statute must be accompanied by a specific intent to use such force. 2 6
In In re Alcantar, the BIA had held that § 16(b) is not limited to
crimes of specific intent, but is broad enough to include reckless
conduct.'
Also, in In re Magallanes-Garcia,the BIA interpreted 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) to include drunk-driving offenses, based on evidence
that drunk driving is inherently reckless."z The BIA also noted that
whether the alien's underlying conviction constitutes an aggravated felony. Dalton v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 604 (7th
Cir. 2001). For further information on the judicial review of removal orders, see Peter
R. Hill, Did Congress Eliminate All Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation,
Exclusion, and Removal for Criminal Aliens?, 2 Bender's Immigr. Bull. 345 (May 15,
1997).
119. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 39, at 8-2.
120. Interim Decision 3412 (BIA 1999).
121. Id. at 2-3. The Texas DWI statute renders a misdemeanor DWI offense a
felony in the third degree upon two prior convictions. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
49.09(b) (Vernon 1974 & Supp. III 2000).
122. Both parties agreed that 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) was inapplicable because the Texas
DWI statute did not include "as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another." Puente-Salazar,Interim
Decision 3412, at 8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000)).
123. Id at 14-15.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id at 12.
127. In re Alcantar, 20 I.&.N. Dec. 801, 813 (BIA 1994) (finding involuntary
manslaughter to be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), because "18 U.S.C. §
16(b) does not require specific intent to do violence. It includes at a minimum

reckless behavior ....).

128. In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Decision 3341, at 6 (BIA 1998). Magallanes-
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the respondent's argument failed to recognize the significant
difference between the term "use" in § 16(a) and the phrase "may be
used" in § 16(b). 12 9 The BIA pointed out that § 16(a) focuses on the
statutory elements of the offense, while § 16(b) focuses on the nature
of the crime, 13° and that deriving a specific-intent requirement from
the language of § 16(b) is an unreasonable inference. 3' The BIA
concluded that the nature of the crime of operating a motor vehicle in
a public place while intoxicated involves a substantial risk that
physical force may be applied. 32
Since Puente-Salazar, the BIA consistently has affirmed alien
removal orders based on felony DWI convictions, and aliens have
appealed these orders to the federal circuit courts. 33
II. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' DISAGREEMENT OVER WHETHER
FELONY DWI ISA CRIME OF VIOLENCE UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
This section presents the circuit courts' disagreement over whether
a felony DWI conviction is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §
16(b), and therefore, a deportable aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(F).
The controversy centers around whether the
language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) requires specific intent to use physical
force. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits held that felony DWI
is not a crime of violence because the statutory language requires an
intentional use of physical force, and drunk driving does not involve
such intent."3 The Ninth Circuit also held that felony DWI is not a
crime of violence, basing its decision on other reasons. 35 The circuit
split was created by the Tenth Circuit's contrary holding that felony
DWI is a crime of violence because the "generic elements of the
offense present 'a substantial risk that physical force... may be
used."" 36

Garcia was convicted of driving under the influence in violation of Arizona's drunkdriving statute. Id. at 2-3. After discussing the magnitude of the drunk-driving
problem and the potential harm inherent in drunk driving, the BIA concluded that
driving under the influence has an "enormous potential to result in harm" and held
the offense to be a crime of violence. Id. at 6. Thus, the BIA again interpreted 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) to include particularly dangerous reckless conduct. Id.
129. Puente-Salazar,Interim Decision 3412, at 12.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See e.g., Montiel-Barraza v. INS, 275 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2002); Dalton v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 602 (7th
Cir. 2001); Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216,1217 (10th Cir. 2001).
134. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 207-08; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 612; United States v.

Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir. 2001).
135. Montiel-Barraza,275 F.3d at 1180; see infra Part II.A.4.
136. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1223.
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A. CircuitsHolding That Felony DIWI Is Not a Crime of Violence

1. The Fifth Circuit: United States v. Chapa-Garza
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether felony DVI
constitutes a crime of violence in United States v. Chiapa-Garza.'31 In

Chapa-Garza,five defendants were convicted in the Western District
of Texas for unlawfully returning to the United States after being

removed.1" The defendants had been subject to removal based on
their felony DWI convictions."' Upon the defendants' appeals, the
Fifth Circuit held that Texas felony DWI is not a crime of violence,
and therefore, not an aggravated felony."4 Central to its holding was
that the language of § 16(b) requires an intentional use of force to

effectuate the crime. 41
Chapa-Garza began by distinguishing the definition of crime of

violence in § 16(b), which applies to the sentencing of aliens, from the
definition found in section 4B1.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,'2
which applies to career offenders. 43 The government had urged the
court to find that any offense that creates a substantial risk of harm,

whether intentional or accidental, is a crime of violence.'" The
Chapa-Garzacourt rejected the government's argument, because such
an interpretation would mean that § 16(b) and section 4B1.2(a)(2) are
construed the same way-a construction the court flatly rejected.1
In comparing § 16(b) and section 4B1.2(a)(2), the court found that
section 4B1.2(a)(2)'s "otherwise" clause contains broader language

137. 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001). Chapa-Garzawas not the first time the Fifth
Circuit addressed the issue. In Canadzo-Marroquinv. INS, the Fifth Circuit held that
Texas felony DWI is a crime of violence. 188 F.3d 649,652 (5th Cir. 1999), withdrawn,
222 F.3d 1040, 1040 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit based its decision on the
substantial risk that drunk driving will result in the use of force. Id. To support this
holding, the court cited statistics on the number of deaths and injuries and the cost in
property damage caused by drunk drivers annually. Id. However, the defendant in
Camacho-Marroquin moved to withdraw his petition for rehearing en banc, so the
INS could deport him in lieu of incarceration. As a result, the Fifth Circuit withdrew
its opinion. Camacho-Marroquin,222 F.3d at 1040.
13& Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 923.
139. Id. The Texas DWI statute provides in relevant part: "If it is shown ... that
the person has previously been convicted two times of an offense relating to the
operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.., the offense is a felony of the third
degree." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.09(b) (Vernon 1974 & Supp. III 2000).
140. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 928. Although the Camacho-Marroquindecision
had been withdrawn, the Fifth Circuit did not address why the court was, in essence,
"reversing" its holding in Canacizo-Marroquin.See id. at 924.
141. Id. at 926-27.
142. See supra note 101 for the sentencing guideline's definition of crime of
violence.
143. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 924-27.
144. Id. at 924.
145. Id.
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than the language of § 16(b).146 The court determined that section

4B1.2(a)(2) only requires that the offense involve conduct presenting
a serious risk of physical injury to another, whereas § 16(b) requires
"a substantial risk that the defendant will use physical force against
another's person or property in the course of committing the
offense.', 47 In other words, the court differentiated between section
4B1.2(a)(2)'s concern with the risk of a particular effect of a
defendant's conduct, i.e. physical injury, and § 16(b)'s concern with
the defendant's conduct itself. 14 The court based its reasoning on the
absence of language in § 16(b) requiring that there be a substantial
risk that another's person or property will sustain injury, but only that
there be
a "substantial risk that the defendant will use physical
149
force.

In addition to urging that § 16(b) should be interpreted differently
from section 4B1.2(a)(2), the court emphasized that the language in §
16(b) refers only to those offenses involving a substantial likelihood
that the defendant will use physical force intentionally. 5 The court
went on to explain that the use of physical force against persons or
property is "most reasonably read to refer to intentional conduct, not
an accidental, unintended event," such as drunk driving. 51 The court
supported its construction with a dictionary definition of the verb
"use," pointing out that the relevant definitions of the verb indicate
that "use" refers to a volitional, purposeful employment of the object
being "used."'"12 The court reasoned:
While the victim of a drunk driver may sustain physical injury from
physical force being applied to his body as a result of collision with
the drunk driver's errant automobile, it is clear that such force has
not been intentionally "used" against the other person by the drunk
driver at all, much less in order to perpetrate any crime, including
the crime of felony DWI.153

The court noted that the crime of felony DWI in Texas is
committed when the defendant, while intoxicated and after two prior
DWI convictions, "begins operating a vehicle."''1 4 Finding that
intentional force against the person or property of another is hardly
146. Id. at 925.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 926.
151. Id.
152. Id. The Court quoted the definition of "use" as:
1. To put into service or apply for a purpose; employ. 2. To avail oneself of;
practice: use caution. 3. To conduct oneself toward; treat or handle: used
his colleagues well. 4. To seek or achieve an end by means of; exploit: felt he
was being used. 5. To take or consume; partake of: She rarely used alcohol.
Id. (quoting the American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed. 1997)).
153. Id. at 927.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
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ever used to start a car, the Fifth Circuit held that felony DVI is not a
crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). "'
2. The Seventh Circuit: Bazan-Reyes v. INS
Four months after Chapa-Garza, the Seventh Circuit in Bazan-

Reyes v. INS156 also held that felony DWI is not a crime of violence
under § 16(b), because the offense does not involve an intentional use

of force.'5s

In Bazan-Reyes, petitioners Jose A. Bazan-Reyes,

Wincenty Z. Maciasowicz,

59

s

and Arnoldo Gomez-Velalw sought

review of INS and BIA decisions finding them removable based on
their state drunk-driving offenses. 61 Before addressing the issue, the
Seventh Circuit stated that it would review de novo the BIA's
determination that petitioners had committed a removable aggravated
felony. 162
The court began by noting that the BIA had interpreted the
definition of crime of violence found in § 16(b) to include reckless
conduct, such as drunk driving."
The petitioners, however,
challenged the BIA's interpretation of the statute, arguing that § 16(b)
requires a substantial risk of intentional force."
The petitioners
claimed that drunk-driving offenses generally do not involve
intentional force or a substantial risk of intentional force, and thus,
such offenses cannot be crimes of violence."6

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the petitioners' construction of §
16(b). Much like the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit distinguished
155. Id.
156. 256 F3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
157. Id. at 612.
158. Bazan-Reyes, a citizen of Mexico, had entered the United States without
inspection. Id. at 602. Bazan-Reyes, whose criminal record included four previous
convictions for DWI, had pleaded guilty to a Class D felony, Operating a Vehicle
While Intoxicated, in violation of section 9-30-5-3 of the Indiana Code. Id. The
relevant provisions of section 9-30-5-3 provide: "A person ... commits a Class D
felony if. (1) the person has a previous conviction of operating while intoxicated; and
(2) the previous conviction of operating while intoxicated occurred within the five (5)
years immediately preceding the occurrence of the violation of section 1 or 2 of this
chapter." Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3 (1998).
159. Maciasowicz was a citizen of Poland and a lawful permanent resident. BazanReyes, 256 F.3d at 603. Maciasowicz had pleaded guilty under the Wisconsin statute
to two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle. Id.
160. Gomez-Vela was a citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the
United States. Id. Gomez-Vela, who had two previous drunk-driving convictions, was
found guilty of aggravated driving under the influence under the Illinois statute. Id.
161. Id. at 602.
162- Id at 605.
163. Id. at 606 (citing In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Decision 3412 (BIA 1999), In re
Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Decision 3341 (BIA 1998), and Matter of Alcantar, 20 I.
& N. Dec. 801,814 (BIA 1994)).
164. Id
165. Id.
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section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines from 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b), finding that section 4B1.2(a)(2) does not contain any
requirement of specific intent, whereas § 16(b) does require
intentional conduct. 66 The court stated that "the physical force that
'may be used in the course of committing the offense' must be
accompanied by intent to use that force."' 67 According to the court,
the petitioners' use of intentional force to open the car door or press
the accelerator did not satisfy the statute's requirement of the
intentional use of physical force. 168 Rather, the force must be actual
violent force. 169 The court then concluded, as did the Fifth Circuit,
that because intentional force is "'virtually never employed to
commit"' drunk-driving offenses, the offenses are not crimes of
violence under § 16(b).17°
3. The Second Circuit: Dalton v. Ashcroft
Joining the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the Second Circuit in Dalton
v. Ashcroft17' held that an alien's New York felony DWI offense was
not a crime of violence.172 In Dalton, the petitioner, a citizen of
Canada and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was
convicted of felony DWI in New York under the New York Vehicle
and Traffic Law, as a third-time offender.7 3 While Dalton was serving
his prison sentence, the INS commenced removal proceedings against
him, charging that he was removable as an aggravated felon because
of his felony DWI conviction. 74 Dalton argued that felony DWI was
not a crime of violence, but the immigration judge rejected his
argument and ordered his removal. 7 5 The Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's removal order, finding that
76 Dalton then appealed
felony DWI constitutes a crime of violence.1
77
the BIA's decision to the Second Circuit.
166. Id. at 608-11.
167. Id. at 611.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 875 n.10 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding that "the force necessary to constitute a crime of violence, must actually be
violent")).
170. Id. at 612 (quoting United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir.
2001)).
171. 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001).

172. Id. at 208.

173. Id. at 202. New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1192.3 provides that
"[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192.3 (McKinney 1996). Section 1193 elevates the crime to a
class D felony when one "operates a vehicle [while intoxicated] after having been
convicted of [DWI] twice within the preceding ten years." Id. § 1193(1)(c)(ii).
174. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
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The Second Circuit began by stating that it would give Chevron
deference"' to the BIA's interpretation of the INA, but would apply
de novo review to the BIA's interpretation of federal or state criminal
statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 16.179 The Second Circuit then applied
the categorical approach to determine whether felony DWI
constitutes a crime of violence, focusing its analysis on the offense's
inherent nature rather than on the factual circumstances underlying
Dalton's violation1m
Upon review of the relevant state court decisions, the Second
Circuit found that the scope of the New York DWI offense is
sufficiently broad to include attempted DWI.' The state courts had
held that a defendant is guilty of driving while intoxicated even if heor she falls asleep at the wheel of a car and the vehicle never moves,'
or if the vehicle itself is not even operativeY0b The court concluded
that New York case law makes clear that a person can be convicted
under the New York DWI statute even when the person's conduct
involves no risk that force may be used or that injury may result."
The court, therefore, could not find that this "minimum threshold,
even if met on three separate occasions" satisfied the definition of a
crime of violence."8
The court rejected the government's contention that the minimum
conduct required for a DWI conviction does, in fact, present a
"substantial risk that physical force... may be used" because the
defendant's intent is the focus of the conduct, and an intent to drink
and drive always presents the risks involved in drunk driving." The
court countered the government's argument by stating that "la]n
intention to drive is not the same as driving." 17 The court proposed
that § 16(b) contemplates a crime of violence to involve "real,
substantial" risks, and therefore, cannot support removal based on
178. See infra text accompanying notes 231-36.
179. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203-04 (citing Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 173-74 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
180. Id. at 204-05.
181. Id. at 205 (citing People v. Prescott, 745 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (N.Y. 2001)). The
Prescottcourt stated:
Our courts have long recognized that the definition of operation is broader
than that of driving and that [a] person operates a motor vehicle within the
meaning of [the statute] when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or
makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence
will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.
Prescott,745 N.E.2d at 1004 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in

original).

182. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 205 (citing People v. Marriott, 325 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (3d
Dep't 1971)).
183. Id. (citing People v. David "W," 442 N.Y.S.2d 278,279 (3d Dep't 1981)).
184. Id
185. Id at 205-06.
186. Id. at 206.
187. Id.
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"hypothetical harms."' 18 Therefore, the court concluded that felony
DWI could not be a crime of violence, because not all violations of
New York's felony DWI statute are by their nature crimes of violence
in that risk of physical force is not a requisite element of the New
York DWI offense.189
The court went on to say that even if New York's DWI statute was
comparable in scope to § 16(b), the language of § 16(b) "fails to
capture the nature of the risk inherent in drunk driving."190 The court
reasoned that the risk of drunk driving is the risk associated with the
resulting accident, not the risk that the driver will "use physical force"
while driving the vehicle.' 9 ' The court stated that pressing the
accelerator or moving the steering wheel cannot reasonably be
interpreted as the use of physical force.' 92 Disagreeing with the
government's argument that the "the crashing of the drunk driver's
automobile... constitutes the force that is likely to be used," the
court noted that "[a]lthough an accident may properly be said to
involve force, one cannot be said to use force in an accident as one
might use force to pry open a heavy, jammed door."' 93
To emphasize the difference between an accident and the
intentional "use of physical force," the court then discussed the
difference between the risk of the "use of physical force" and the "risk
of injury."'' " The government had argued that the difference, if any, is
insignificant. 95 The court disagreed, claiming that many crimes
involve a substantial risk of injury without involving the use of
force. 196 The court rejected the contention that all conduct involving a
risk of injury necessarily involves the use of physical force and agreed
with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the word "use" along with the
phrase "in the course of committing the offense" supports interpreting
§ 16(b) to include only intentional conduct. 97 Thus, the Second
Circuit concluded that a felony DWI conviction under the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law does not constitute a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 98
188. Id. (noting that "[j]ust as many good intentions are crushed by reality, so too
can reality felicitously crush bad intentions").
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 207.
195. Id.
196. Id. The court cited as examples crimes of gross negligence or reckless
endangerment-such as leaving an infant alone near a pool and statutes criminalizing
the use, possession and/or distribution of dangerous drugs-to illustrate that some
criminal conduct may involve a substantial risk of injury or harm without involving
the use of physical force. Id.
197. Id. at 207-08.
198. Id. at 208.
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4. The Ninth Circuit: Montiel-Barrazav. INS
In the most recent decision addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and held that
felony DWI is not a crime of violence.199 In Montiel-Barraza v. INS,
Ramon Montiel-Barraza petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review a
removal order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals.2 ° The
BIA had deemed Montiel-Barraza an aggravated felon based on his
felony conviction under the California Vehicle Code for driving under
the influence of alcohol ("DUI") with four prior convictions within
the past seven years.201
Relying on its own precedent, the Ninth Circuit held that MontielBarraza's conviction did not constitute a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16(b).= In United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, the Ninth
Circuit had held that a conviction for driving under the influence with
injury to another is not a crime of violence.2 -3 The present case,
24
however, involved a DUI offense without proof of injury to another. 7
Because the court had previously held that driving under the influence
with injury to another did not constitute a crime of violence, it could
not logically hold that a violation of the "lesser" offense qualified as a
crime of violence.205 The court refused to take into account the fact
that Montiel-Barraza's conviction was elevated to a felony, stating
that enhancement statutes do not "alter the elements of the
underlying offense."'
B. The Tenth Circuit'sHolding that Felony DWI Is a Crime of
Violence: Tapia Garcia v. INS
In a decision that preceded the four other circuits' decisions
addressing the issue, the Tenth Circuit held in Tapia Garcia v. INS
that an alien's Idaho DUI offense constituted a crime of violence.'
In Tapia Garcia, the petitioner, a legal permanent resident of the
United States and citizen of Mexico, was convicted in Idaho for felony
DUI in violation of the Idaho Code.'
As a result, the INS
199. Montiel-Barraza v. INS, 275 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002).
200. Id. at 1179.

201. Id.; see also Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §§ 23152(a), 23550 (West 2000 & Supp.
2002).
202. Montiel-Barraza,275 F.3d at 1180.
203. United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2001).
204. Montiel-Barraza,275 F.3d at 1180.
205. Id.
206. Id
207. Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2001).
208. Id. at 1217. Under the Idaho Code, a DUI offense qualifies as a felony if the
defendant pleaded guilty to or was found guilty of two or more previous violations for
driving under the influence within five years. Idaho Code § 18-8005(5) (Michie 1997
& Supp. 2001).

2134

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

commenced removal proceedings against him for committing a crime
of violence. 20 9 The immigration judge held that Tapia-Garcia's felony
DUI offense constituted a crime of violence and ordered him
removed to Mexico, a decision that was affirmed by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.210 Tapia-Garcia appealed his removal order to
the Tenth Circuit.2 '
As an initial matter, the Tenth Circuit outlined the test laid out 212
in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
which governed the court's review of the BIA's interpretation of
immigration statutes.2 13 According to the Chevron test, the court must
first determine whether the plain language of the statute clearly
demonstrates Congress's intent. 14
If the statute is "silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the court must then
determine whether the BIA's interpretation is "based on a permissible
construction of the statute. '215 If the statute is unclear and the BIA's
interpretation 21 6is reasonable, the court must defer to that
interpretation.
The Tenth Circuit then reviewed the BIA's reasoning and found
that the BIA had previously held that offenses for operating a vehicle
while intoxicated constituted a crime of violence, provided the offense
rose to a felony under state law.217 The BIA emphasized that a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) does not require intentional
conduct, but concluded that the operation of a vehicle while under the
influence, by its nature, involves a substantial risk of physical force
against the person or property of another.2 8
Upon review of the BIA's construction of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the
Tenth Circuit held that the BIA reasonably construed the statute to
include felony drunk-driving offenses. 219 The court reasoned that the
well-documented dangers associated with drunk driving supports the
BIA's conclusion that a felony DWI offense constitutes a crime of
violence under § 16(b). 220 The court stated that "'the risk of injury
from drunk driving is neither conjectural or speculative.... Drunk
driving is a reckless act that often results in injury, and the risks of
driving while intoxicated are well known."' 2 The Tenth Circuit thus
209. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1217.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
213. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1220.
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
216. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1220-21.
217. Id. at 1222.
218. Id. (citing In re Puente-Salazar, Interim Decision 3412 (BIA 1999).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1223.
221. Id. at 1222 (quoting United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1008-09 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
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indicated that a crime of violence does not require an intentional
act.m The court also noted that the language of U.S. Sentencing
Guideline section 4B1.2(a)(2) is similar to that of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
and that both definitions of crime of violence support the conclusion
that felony DUI may constitute a crime of violence because the
"generic elements of the offense" present a "substantial risk that
physical force... may be used."'
For the above reasons, the Tenth
Circuit held that Tapia-Garcia was an alien subject to deportation for
the commission of an aggravated felony.24
III. INTERPRETING 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
The disagreement among the circuits demonstrates the difficulties
of interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Although four circuits have held
otherwise, Part III.A will argue that the BIA and the Tenth Circuit
correctly determined that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) does not require conduct
involving specific intent and that felony DWI constitutes a crime of
violence under the plain language of the statute. Part III.B suggests
that congressional policies regarding removal further support a
finding that felony DWI constitutes a removable offense. Finally,
given the difficulty of statutory construction and the resulting circuit
split, Part III.C proposes an amendment to 18 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(F).
A. Felony DWI Constitutes a Crime of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. §
16(b)
This part begins with a discussion of the proper standard of review
for circuit courts when interpreting § 16(b) for the purposes of
removal, and then presents arguments supporting the conclusion that
felony DWI constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
1. The Proper Standard of Review
The circuit courts that disagree on whether felony DWI constitutes
a crime of violence for deportation purposes also seem to disagree on
the applicable standard of review. The dispute centers around
whether to apply a de novo standard of review or a more deferential
Chevron' standard of review to the BIA's interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b).1 The Tenth Circuit applied Chevron deference to the BIA's
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), holding that as long as the BIA's
222. Id
223. Id at 1222-23; cf supra notes 143-49, 166-70 and accompanying text

(discussing the Fifth and Seventh Circuits' findings that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
section 4B1.2(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) differ significantly).
224. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1223.
225. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
226. See supra Part I.C.3.b for the BIA's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
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interpretation was reasonable, the court would defer to that
interpretation.2 7 On the other hand, the Second and Seventh Circuits
stated that they would apply Chevron deference to the BIA's
interpretation of the INA, but would review de novo the BIA's
interpretation of federal or state criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C.
§ 16.18 The Fifth Circuit case involved an appeal from the district
court, not from the BIA.2 9 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit did not
mention Chevron, but applied a de novo standard of review, claiming
that a district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is
reviewed de novo. 0
It is well-established that Chevron requires federal courts to accord
substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of the statutes it
administers if the intent of Congress is unclear and the agency's
interpretation is reasonable? 1 If the relevant statutory provision is
silent or ambiguous, "a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency. ''12 Rather, the court must only decide
whether the agency's determination is based on a "permissible
construction of the statute. ' '23 The Chevron deference, however, only
M
applies when an agency is interpreting a statute it administers.2
Some courts have held that Chevron deference will only apply to an
inquiry "that implicates agency expertise in a meaningful way. ' 235
When the agency is interpreting state or federal criminal laws, the
courts do not owe Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation
because "the agency is not charged with the administration of such
laws.""u6 For example, the Fifth Circuit claimed that it "must uphold
the BIA's determination of what conduct constitutes moral turpitude
[under the INA] if it is reasonable. However, a determination of the

227. Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1220-21.
228. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Sutherland v.
Reno. 228 F.3d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2000)); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 605

(7th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit did not mention Chevron deference, but stated that
it would review the "threshold issue of whether Montiel's conviction constituted an
aggravated felony." Montiel-Barraza v. INS, 275 F.3d 1179,1180 (9th Cir. 2002).
229. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 2001).

230. Id. (citing United States v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1998)).
231. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d
253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000).
232. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
233. Id. at 843.
234. Id. at 842.
235. Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1999); Goncalves v. Reno, 144
F.3d 110, 127 (1st Cir. 1998).
236. Michel, 206 F.3d at 262 ("[Wjhere the BIA is interpreting [a provision] of the
[INA], Chevron deference is warranted, but where the BIA is interpreting state or
federal criminal laws, we must review its decision de novo ....
").
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elements of a [state] crime.., for purposes of deportation' 3 pursuant to
[the INA] is a question of law, which we review de novo."
A review of Chevron and the applicable case law suggests that a
court, in fact, is not required to defer to the BIA's interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) when deciding whether a certain offense constitutes a
crime of violence . 3
It is not likely that the BIA relied on
immigration expertise to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 16, which is a general
federal criminal statute, and not an immigration law. Moreover, the
BIA is not specifically charged with the administration of 18 U.S.C. §
16. Although the INA defines an aggravated felony in 8 U.S.C. §
1103(a)(43)(F) by reference to the definition of crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), such a reference does not make 18 U.S.C. §
16(b) a part of the INA.39

The next section will argue that, even though the circuit courts may
not owe Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
16(b), the better interpretation of the language of the statute is that
the statute includes felony DWI. Thus, while the Tenth Circuit may
have been incorrect in deferring to the BIA's interpretation of §
16(b), it was correct in concluding that the BIA's interpretation was
reasonable.
2. Interpreting the Language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
a. "physicalforce ... may be used"

The circuit courts that have held that felony DVI is not a crime of
violence based their decisions primarily on the proposition that 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) requires specific intent to use physical force, which is
absent from drunk-driving offenses. However, a better interpretation
of the phrase "may be used" under § 16(b) is that it encompasses both
accidental and intentional uses of force.
First, the Legislature's use of the passive phrase "may be used,"
rather than more definitively volitional language, suggests that it did
237. Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
23& See Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the BIA's
determination that a particular conviction qualifies as a crime of violence is not
entitled to any particular deference); Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir.

2000) (same).

239. See Francis, 269 F.3d at 168 ("[18 U.S.C. § 16] is not transformed into an
immigration law merely because it is incorporated into the INA by §
1101(a)(43)(F).").
240. Even if the courts do not owe Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation
of § 16(b), one could argue that some level of deference is due, such as Skidmore
deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that the
weight accorded to an administrative judgment "will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control").
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not intend § 16(b) to carry a specific-intent requirement. Moreover,
the language of § 16(b) contains no specific-intent terms, and a court
should "not presume that a statutory crime requires specific intent in
'
Even if § 16(b) requires
the absence of language to that effect."241
general intent, rather than the specific intent to use force, drunkdriving "accidents" would not occur if the intoxicated driver did not
consciously decide to operate a vehicle while drunk.

The circuits

holding that felony DWI is not a crime of violence spend much time
emphasizing that drunk driving is an "accidental, unintended
event." 42 According to the Seventh Circuit, "a drunk driving accident
is not the result of plan, direction, or purpose, but of recklessness at

worst and misfortune at best."243 To characterize a drunk driving
accident as a "misfortune," however, is an injustice to the thousands
who have been injured or killed by drunk drivers. An intoxicated
person who consciously decides to drive has the requisite plan,
direction, and purpose to satisfy any general intent requirement under

§ 16(b). 2 "
Second, although the dictionary definitions of "use" may generally
refer to intentional acts, these definitions do not preclude nonintentional uses. As described in Part II.A, the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits relied on a dictionary definition of "use" to conclude that the
phrase "physical force... may be used" requires an intentional use of
force. 45 The Black's Law Dictionarydefines "use" as the "application
or employment of something. '246 This definition does not indicate
that the "application" must be intentional. Although a drunk driver
who injures a pedestrian may not wish to say that he "used" his car to
hurt someone, 247 nonetheless, the harm was the result of the
application of force. The force is that of "the crashing of the drunk
driver's automobile" into the person or property of another.2 48 The
Fifth Circuit stated in Chapa-Garzathat "the victim of a drunk driver
may sustain physical injury from physical force being applied to his
241. United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 81 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States
v. Hicks, 980 F.2d 963, 974 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that Congress required only
"general intent" by its failure to use words of specific intent); United States v. Lewis,
780 F.2d 1140, 1143 (4th Cir. 1986) (same).
242. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 2001)).
243. Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States
v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370,372) (7th Cir. 1995)).
244. The drunk driver typically intends to drink and drive. The intent to commit
the risk-creating act conceivably may be "transferred" to the resulting harm just as in
felony-murder cases.
245. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 926 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000)); BazanReyes, 256 F.3d at 608.
246. Black's Law Dictionary 1540 (7th ed. 1999).
247. See Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 372-73 ("A drunk driver who injures a pedestrian
would not describe the incident by saying he 'used' his car to hurt someone. In
ordinary English, the word 'use' implies intentional availment.").
248. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2001).
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body as a result of collision with the drunk driver's errant
automobile." 9 Although the Fifth Circuit argued that such force
cannot be "used" unintentionally, it is clear that when one car slams
into another (or into a pedestrian), the resulting force is what causes

the injury- -5

Moreover, Chapa-Garza seems to squarely contradict an earlier
decision in which the Fifth Circuit interpreted § 16(b) to include both
accidental and intentional uses of force. In United States v. GalvanRodriguez,. 1 the Fifth Circuit held that the unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle is a crime of violence under § 16(b) because of the
strong probability that the inexperienced or untrustworthy driver...
will be involved in or will cause a traffic accident or expose the car
to stripping or vandalism. In fact, when an illegal alien operates a
vehicle without consent, a strong probability exists that the alien
may try to evade the authorities by precipitating a high-speed car
chase and thereby risking the lives of others, not
- to mention
significant damage to the vehicle and other property.
Thus, in Galvan-Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit clearly relied on the risk
that physical force may accidentally be used during the unauthorized
operation of a vehicle, rather than solely on the risk that physical
force may be used intentionally, to find the offense to be a crime of
violence.
Attempting to explain the apparent contradiction, the Fifth Circuit
claimed that Chapa-Garza and Galvan-Rodriguez are compatible
because the unauthorized use of a vehicle does, in fact, involve a
substantial risk that physical force will be used intentionally against a
vehicle to obtain unauthorized access to it3-"3 However, even a
cursory reading of the court's reasoning in Galvan-Rodriguez
indicates that the Fifth Circuit held the unauthorized use of a vehicle
to be a crime of violence because of the potential unintended
consequences associated with the act of driving an unauthorized
vehicle, such as damaging property and injuring innocent victims,
rather than the intentional act of breaking into the vehicle3p It is
249. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 927 (emphasis added).
250. Id. For further illustration, someone who accidentally elbows a fellow
basketball player in the mouth does not intentionally use force against that person,
but it would not be unreasonable to say that force was "used" to knock out the
player's teeth. On August 4, 2001, a New York City police officer killed three
members of a family and an unborn child when he drove his minivan into them while
driving drunk to work. See Shaila K. Dewan, Police Officer Is Arraigned in Fatal
Crash, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2001, at B1. Again, it is reasonable to assert that a great
deal of force was used to mow down the three pedestrians in one swift blow. In both
cases, it was the application, or "use," of force that caused the harm, whether that use
was intentional or accidental.
251. 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999).
252. Id. at 219-20.
253. See Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 927-28.
254. See supra text accompanying note 252.
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difficult to believe that the Fifth Circuit in Galvan-Rodriguez held
that the unauthorized use of a vehicle is a crime of violence solely
because of the risk of harm associated with gaining access to the
vehicle. In fact, in a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit itself wrote that
"Galvan-Rodriguez holds that [the unauthorized use of a vehicle's]
risk to persons and property is sufficiently high to constitute a § 16
crime of violence," noticeably emphasizing the risk of harm, rather
than the intentional use of force. 5 The Fifth Circuit, as well as the
other circuits, should have applied the Galvan-Rodriguez reasoning to
find that felony DWI is a crime of violence under § 16(b), because the
inherent risks of drunk driving are at least as substantial and severe as
joyriding, and perhaps, even more imminent.2 6
b. "in the course of committing the offense"
Another requirement of the "crime of violence" definition under §
16(b) is that force be used "in the course of committing the offense."
The Fifth Circuit construed this phrase to refer to the force necessary
to effectuate, or begin, the offense.25 7 The court then held that felony
DWI is not a crime of violence, because a driver commits the offense
once he begins operating the car, an act that rarely, if ever, involves
the use of force. 8 The Seventh Circuit agreed, stating that using
intentional force to open the car door or press the accelerator, for
example, does not constitute the requisite use of physical force under
the statute.2 9
These interpretations, however, are disturbing. Although a drunk
driver may not use physical force to begin the commission of the
offense-i.e., starting the car-the risk is that he will use physical
force "in the course of committing the offense."
The better
interpretation of this phrase is that it encompasses the force used
while committing the offense, including the time spent on the road.
Indeed, an individual is guilty of DWI as soon as he begins operating
the vehicle and sometimes even earlier, but the offense clearly
continues as long as he continues to drive.2 10 Thus, the analysis of
whether a drunk-driving offense involves a substantial risk of physical
255. United States v. Jackson, 220 F.3d 635, 639 (5th Cir. 2000).
256. See, e.g., Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
"unauthorized use of an automobile [involves] all of the attendant dangers of high
speed chases, speeding, and recklessness.... The dangers of operating an automobile
while one's faculties are impaired by drugs or alcohol are all too obvious, and too
common to require further elaboration." (emphasis added)); see also infra text
accompanying notes 273-81.
257. Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 927.
258. Id.
259. Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001).
260. See United States v. Chapa-Garza, 262 F.3d 479, 484 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Barksdale, J., dissenting) ("A driver exerts personal effort not only when he begins
operation of the vehicle but also 'while' he operates it.").
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force should encompass the entire continuum of the offense, from
starting the ignition to driving to turning the engine off. Such an
analysis would then support a finding that drunk driving indeed
involves a "substantial risk that physical force... may be used in the
course of committing the offense."
c. "by its nature,involves a substantialrisk"
Even if felony DWI involves a risk that physical force may be used
against the person or property of another, § 16(b) requires that the
offense, "by its nature," involve a "substantialrisk" that such force be
used.261 As previously discussed, the language "by its nature" requires
the courts to analyze the elements of the felony in the abstract, rather
than the particular facts of each individual commission of the
offense. 2 When analyzing the phrase "substantial risk," courts have
stated that it is not necessary that "[the risk] must occur in every
instance; rather, a substantial risk requires only a strong probability
that the event, in this case the application of physical force during the
commission of the crime, will occur."'
The task, then, is to
determine whether felony DWI offenses2 categorically involve a
strong probability that physical force against the person or property of
another will occur. The following discussion will show that felony
DWI is an offense that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk of the
use of physical force.
In support of their holding that felony DWI is not a crime of
violence, the Second and Seventh Circuits noted that an offense, such
as drunk driving, that includes behavior posing little or no risk cannot
"by its nature" constitute a crime of violence.2t Indeed, some courts
have interpreted drunk-driving offenses to include minimally
threatening conduct, such as passing out at the wheel of a car before
the vehicle ever moves, or intending to operate a vehicle that is
nonetheless unable to move.2
Contrary to the reasoning of the Second and Seventh Circuits,
however, other courts have held that an offense can be a crime of
violence even if the offense includes conduct involving little or no risk.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
262. See supra Part I.C.2.
263. United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d 18, 20 (5th Cir. 1995); see also

United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418,420 (5th Cir. 1996).
264. As noted earlier, for the purposes of this Note, felony DWI refers to those
drunk-driving offenses which rise to a felony because of prior drunk-driving

convictions. See supra note 8 for examples of felony DWI statutes. The various
felony DWI statutes require at least one and up to five prior DWI convictions. See
supra note 8.

265. See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS,
256 F.3d 600, 611-12 (7th Cir. 2001).
266. See Dalton,257 F.3d at 205.
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For example, in United States v. Payne,267 the Sixth Circuit held
larceny to be a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines,
because it presented a serious potential risk of physical injury, even
when committed against a sleeping or unconscious victim.216 The
court reasoned that these situations still involve a serious potential
risk of injury, because the victim might "notice the pickpocketing act,
wake from her sleep, or not be unconscious after all. '269 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit held that burglary of a temporarily unoccupied
dwelling constituted a crime of violence because of the possibility that
the absent resident will return home during the commission of the
crime.27

The likelihood that a driver who passes out at the wheel of a

non-moving vehicle will awaken and start driving while still legally
intoxicated seems at least as great as the chance that an absent
resident will return home, or that an unconscious larceny victim will
awaken and suddenly be exposed to physical harm. Thus, if crimes
such as larceny and burglary are sufficiently risky, based on
hypothetical harms, to qualify as crimes of violence, certainly felony
DWI should qualify as well.
In his dissent to Dalton, Chief Judge Walker also suggests that a
better view of the categorical approach is one that considers the
nature of the offense to include the risks associated with the
"proscribed conduct in the mainstream of prosecutions brought under
the statute. '271 Indeed, it is the risk of harm from drunk drivers on the
road that compelled the enactment of drunk-driving statutes, rather
than the protection of victims from intoxicated would-be drivers who
fall asleep behind the wheel of a disabled car. Thus, when
contemplating whether the "nature" of felony DWI involves the
requisite risk of force against the person and property of another,
courts should consider what type of conduct is being targeted-the
operation of a vehicle while intoxicated-rather than focus on the
outer reaches of the statute.
As to whether felony DWI constitutes a "substantial risk" that
physical force may be used, repeated convictions for drinking and
driving create a "strong probability that... the application of physical
force... will occur. ' 272 The fact that a driver's use of alcohol
increases the risk of crashing is commonly known and welldocumented. From 1999 to 2000, traffic deaths in alcohol-related
accidents rose by four percent,273 which is the largest recorded
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

163 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 375 n.3.
Id.
United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191,196 (4th Cir. 1991).
Dalton, 257 F.3d at 209 (Walker, C.J., dissenting).

272. United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d 18, 20 (5th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1996).
273. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transport., Traffic Safety
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In 2000, there were

16,653 alcohol-related fatalities, representing forty percent of the total
traffic fatalities in 2000 and an average of one alcohol-related death
every thirty-two minutes. 75 An estimated 310,000 persons suffered
injuries in crashes where police reported the presence of alcohol. 6
Moreover, empirical evidence shows that a driver who is intoxicated
is significantly more likely to cause injury or death. The risk of a
driver being killed in a crash at 0.10% blood alcohol concentration
("BAC") is at least twenty-nine times higher than that of drivers
without alcohol in their system? 7 An experiment sponsored by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") further
supports the proposition that intoxication sufficiently impairs a
driver's performance to present a substantial risk of harm to himself,
to others, or to property. 278 Using a broad sampling of the driving
population,27 9 the study showed that major driving skills were
impaired at BACs as low as 0.02% on some important measures for a
majority of subjects.2 A person who drives with such impaired skills
inevitably causes a risk that physical force may be used against the
person or property of another. The results also indicated that as
BACs rose, the percentage of individuals exhibiting impaired skills, as
well as the magnitude of the impairment, increased. 2st Thus, in the
case of a driver with a BAC of 0.10%, the risk of the use of force is
arguably "substantial."'
Facts 2000, Alcohol, http:/I-vww.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-30Incsa/ifactshet.html
[hereinafter NHTSA 2000 Traffic Sheets]. The NHTSA defines a fatal traffic crash as
alcohol-related if a driver or a pedestrian has a blood alcohol concentration ("BAC")
of 0.01% or greater in a reported traffic crash. Id. The NHTSA considers those
involved in fatal crashes with a BAC of 0.10% or greater to be intoxicated. Id. Most
states deem a person with a 0.10% BAC legally intoxicated. Id.
274. Statement of Millie I. Webb, New Government Research Shows Nation's
Largest Percentage Increase in Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities (Sept. 24, 2001),
http://www.madd.org/news/0,1056,2326,00.html.
275. NHTSA 2000 Traffic Sheets, supra note 273.
276. Id.
277. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Stats and Resources, BAC, available at
http'//www.madd.orgtstats/0,1056,1767,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). Although
18 U.S.C. § 16(b) requires that the risk of the use of physical force be against the
person or property of another, one can suppose that a crash sufficiently serious to
cause the death of the driver involves a substantial risk to other drivers, pedestrians,
and property.
278. See H. Moskowitz et al., U.S. Dep't of Transport., Driver Characteristics and
Impairment at Various BACs at ii (2000). The purpose of this laboratory study was
to determine the extent of driving skill impairment at BACs from zero to 0.10%, and
whether certain driver characteristics affect alcohol impairment. See id.
279. The study examined the effects of alcohol on driving skills in a sample of 168
subjects of different ages, genders, and drinking practices. Id.
280. Id. at 22.
281. Id.
282. In an earlier study, the NHTSA systematically estimated relative risk for
intoxicated drivers with BACs between 0.08% and 0.10% and, based on the results,
concluded that "drinking and driving at BACs under 0.10% is very dangerous." See
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The requirement of prior convictions inherent in felony DWI
offenses also increases the risks associated with the crime. Although
the prior convictions may not necessarily increase the chance that the
defendant will cause injury the third or fourth time, the risk that the
defendant will cause injury on one of his several drunk-driving
incidents is greater than if he had committed only one prior offense.'"
In fact, in 1999, one out of nine intoxicated drivers involved in fatal
crashes had previously been convicted for DWI within the prior three
years. 4 Thus, drunk driving undoubtedly involves a substantial risk
of the use of physical force against the person or property of another.
The preceding analysis of the plain language and structure of 18
U.S.C. § 16 shows that the better interpretation of the statute is that
felony DWI constitutes a crime of violence.
B. CongressionalPolicies Regarding Removal: A Hard-Line
Approach to the Problem of CriminalAliens
This section will argue that, although Congress has not expressly
included felony DWI as a crime of violence, such an inclusion is
nonetheless consistent with congressional policies regarding removal.
In delegating its constitutional authority over immigration,
Congress has clearly taken a hard-line position against criminal aliens.
Since the 1980s, Congress has focused particular attention on criminal
aliens, expanding removal grounds, decreasing the availability of
discretionary relief, expediting removal procedures, and restricting
judicial review of removal orders.2 Although there has been some
support for a more sympathetic position,286 a majority of Congress has
shown approval for the tough attitude it has taken toward criminal
aliens. For example, in 1990, the House Judiciary Committee stated
that it was "deeply disturbed that INS has not placed a higher priority
on the criminal alien problem....

The Committee is convinced that

among the classes of aliens deserving of deportation no class should
receive greater attention than aliens convicted of serious criminal
offenses."'
A statement by Senator Graham further illustrates
Congress's sentiment towards criminal aliens:
[T]housands of... aliens in our criminal justice system... have
somehow escaped justice or deportation....

It is the Federal

P.L. Zador et al., Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Relative Risk of Fatal and
Crash Involvement by BAC, Age and Gender 10 (2000).
283. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200,210 (2d Cir. 2001) (Walker, C.J., dissenting).
284. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Stats and Resources, DUI,
http://www.madd.org/madd/stats/0,1056,1784,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
285. See supra Part I.B.3.
286. Rep. Barney Frank (D. Mass) called the congressional attitude toward
deportation "inhumane, disruptive not just to individuals, but to other countries, and
wholly unjustified." 143 Cong. Rec. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1997).
287. H.R. Rep. No. 101-681, pt. 1, at 145 (1990).
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Government's responsibility to protect our borders. If the
Government fails to prevent dangerous aliens from crossing our
borders, it then becomes the responsibility of the Federal
Government to help the States cope with the crime and the costs of

prosecuting criminal aliens. Finally, the Federal Government must
make sure that dangerous aliens are not on the streets, not allowed
to commit new crimes, and not caught in a lengthy deportation
process.m
Thus, although its legislation is sometimes less than clear, Congress
has been explicit in its message that it will not favor more lenient
policies towards criminal aliens at the cost of the rights and liberties of
American citizens.'
The courts, however, traditionally have been more sympathetic to
the criminal alien and have displayed some hesitation in
wholeheartedly supporting congressional desire. 2 Indeed, some of
the offenses Congress has considered sufficiently serious to warrant
removal are questionable-i.e., gambling offenses. Nonetheless, for
the sake of a uniform policy between the branches and, more
importantly, considering Congress's broad authority over
immigration, the courts should be compelled to "acknowledge and
implement [Congress's] will."291
Granted, it is not clear whether Congress specifically intended a
deportable crime of violence to include felony DWI. However, the
hard-line position that Congress has taken with regard to criminal
aliens suggests that the inclusion of felony DWI as a deportable crime
would not be beyond the scope of congressional desire. Arguably, a
Congress that has made certain gambling offenses a deportable crime
would not balk at the idea of deporting an alien for felony DWI,
which is generally a more dangerous and iniquitous offense. Certain
reckless conduct can be just as dangerous as intentional conduct, and
it is likely that Congress intended some dangerous, reckless criminal
acts to qualify as crimes of violence for removal purposes. However,
Congress must draft its legislation carefully to reflect its intent more
clearly.29
288. 136 Cong. Rec. S17741 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Graham).
289. Congress continues to promote programs that successfully identify and deport
criminal aliens. See 143 Cong. Rec. H2617 (daily ed. May 14, 1997) (discussing a

successful INS pilot program in California that identified and deported criminal aliens
in city detention facilities); see also 143 Cong. Rec. E1439 (daily ed. July 16, 1997)

(statement of Rep. Ron Packard) (expressing outrage at former Attorney General
Janet Reno's unilateral decision to suspend a large number of deportation

proceedings).
290. Newcomb, supra note 22, at 718.
291. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Hampton v.

Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) ("[T]he power over aliens is of a
political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review." (citing Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,713 (1893))).
292. Another reason that Congress should draft its legislation more clearly is to
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C. A ProposedAmendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43)(F)
Part III.A argued that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) does
not require specific intent to use physical force, thus allowing within
its scope some non-intentional conduct, such as drunk-driving
felonies. Part III.B then suggested that Congress's apparent intent
and policy to deal harshly with criminal aliens supports the inclusion
of felony DWI among the long list of removable offenses Congress
has already established. This Note concludes by proposing that
Congress amend 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) by dropping the reference
to 18 U.S.C. § 16 and incorporating the language of section
4B1.2(a)(2) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.2 93 Such an amendment
would clarify the immigration law's definition of crime of violence to
include some non-intentional conduct, such as felony DWI.
Initially, the "crime of violence" definitions found in section 4B1.2
and 18 U.S.C. § 16 were identical, because the Sentencing Guidelines
defined crime of violence by referring to the definition found in 18
U.S.C. § 16.294 This changed in 1989 when the Sentencing Commission
adopted the definition of crime of violence now found in section
4B1.2.295 Although the language of the first prongs of the two

definitions, i.e., section 4B1.2(a)(1) and § 16(a), are still nearly
identical, the language of section 4B1.2(a)(2) is now distinct from §
16(b). 96

In amending the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission noted that it did not intend to change the substance of
the guideline, but only to clarify its meaning."9 Likewise, the
prevent the courts from having to invoke the Rule of Lenity as embodied in "the
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes
in favor of the alien." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). When
interpreting the scope of a criminal statute, the court must discern the intent of
Congress from the statute's language, structure, and legislative history. Garrett v.
United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985). Where a reasonable doubt remains regarding
a statute's intended scope, the court will apply the Rule of Lenity and construe the
statute in favor of the defendant. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107-08
(1990). This rule is based on the premise that a penal statute must "define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.
1989) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)), overruled on other
grounds by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
The courts may find that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is sufficiently ambiguous to apply
the Rule of Lenity. Moreover, Congress has been noticeably silent as to whether the
specific crime of felony DWI constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.
The courts then would be required to construe the statute in the light most favorable
to the criminal alien, and hold that felony DWI is not a crime of violence.
293. See supra note 101.
294. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 106-07 (1997).
295. See id.
296. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16's definition of crime of violence in Part I.C.1 with the
Sentencing Commission's definition in supra note 101.
297. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 107 ("The purpose of this
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Legislature should clarify the immigration law's definition of crime of
violence by adopting language similar to the "otherwise" clause of
section 4B1.2(a)(2). The immigration law's definition of crime of
violence at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) would then read:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or

(b) any other offense that is a felony and involves conduct that
presents a seriouspotentialrisk ofphysical injury to another.

The new language of the Sentencing Guidelines has proven more
clear than the language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Since Congress amended
section 4B1.2(a)(2), the courts have held that, unlike § 16(b), section
4B1.2(a)(2) clearly includes both intentional and non-intentional
conduct. For example, in United States v. Rutherford,- the Seventh
Circuit held that section 4B1.2(a)(2) does not require the specific
intent to use force, but encompasses reckless conduct that presents a
serious risk of injury. 299 The court then held that drunk driving
constitutes a crime of violence under section 4B1.2(a)(2), because the
"risk of injury from drunk driving is neither conjectural nor
speculative."3 "0 The Second and Fifth Circuits also distinguished the
two statutes and found that section 4B1.2(a)(2) contains broader
language than § 16(b) in that it defines a crime of violence by its
"resultant injury" rather than by the use of force."1 The Third Circuit
agreed, stating that the revised language of section 4B1.2(a)(2)
includes conduct involving a "lower mens rea of 'pure' recklessness:
... lack[ing] an intent, desire, or willingness to use force or cause
harm at all."'
The Third Circuit then cited drunk driving as an
example of an offense that would be includable under the new
language, because a "drunk driver risks causing severe injury to others
on the road or in the car, [even though] he or she does not intend to
use force to harm others."3

3

Thus, the agreement of the courts in

their interpretation of section 4B1.2(a)(2) suggests that adopting
similar language in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) would clarify the
immigration law's "crime of violence" definition to include certain
reckless conduct that is particularly dangerous, such as felony DWI.

amendment is to clarify the definition[ of crime of violence .... ").
298. 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995).
299. Id. at 374.
300. Id. at 376.
301. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. ChapaGarza, 243 F.3d 921, 925 (5th Cir. 2001).
302. United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858,866 (3d Cir. 1992).
303. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, those who make and administer the laws must
consider the harsh consequences of removal in determining which
crimes warrant such a penalty. However, the acknowledgement that
"deportation is a drastic measure" must be balanced with the need to
protect America and its citizens from serious crimes committed by
alien criminals. 3° Although some may think it unfair, nowhere is the
phrase "[o]bedience to the law is demanded as a right" more true than
in the case of the criminal alien. 3 °5 The American government has and
will continue to deal harshly with aliens who commit serious crimes in
the United States. The difficult question, however, is determining
which crimes are sufficiently serious to warrant removal from the
United States.
Felony DWI is a sufficiently violent and dangerous offense to
warrant removal as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and a
deportable aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). The
plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) can reasonably be read to
conclude that felony DWI, which "exacts a high societal toll in the
forms of death, injury, and property damage,"3" involves a
"substantial risk that physical force ... may be used." 3 Congress's
consistently firm policies towards criminal aliens further support such
a conclusion. To better reflect its intent, however, Congress should
amend the immigration law's definition of crime of violence to include
more clearly some particularly dangerous reckless conduct. Such an
amendment would allow the courts to recognize that repeatedly
drinking and driving at the risk of harming property and innocent
victims is, in fact, a crime of violence warranting removal from the
United States.

304. See supra text accompanying note 1 and Introduction.
305. See supra text accompanying note 2. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated
that, in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization,
"Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,80 (1976).
306. In re Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Decision 3341, at 6 (BIA 1998).
307. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000).

